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Abstract 
Using state-level variation in the timing of political reforms, we find that an 
increase in female representation in local government induces a large and 
significant rise in documented crimes against women in India. Our evidence 
suggests that this increase is good news, as it is driven primarily by greater 
reporting rather than greater incidence of such crimes. In contrast, we find no 
increase in crimes against men or gender-neutral crimes. We also examine the 
effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation: large scale 
membership of women in local councils affects crime against them more than 
their presence in higher level leadership positions. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most fundamental aspects of civil society is the assurance of personal 
safety and fair treatment under the law for all citizens. However, protecting the 
rights of disadvantaged groups, such as population minorities and politically 
under-represented citizens, has remained a challenge in many developing 
countries, and even in developed ones. Individuals from such groups are often the 
target of a whole gamut of injustices, ranging from everyday indignities such as 
verbal abuse and discrimination to serious crimes including murder and even 
genocide. Concerned governments have considered a broad range of policies to 
prevent or redress such injustices, including welfare support, affirmative action 
quotas in education and jobs, legal protection and allocation of more law 
enforcement resources. Our paper is the first to examine the consequences of a 
very different policy reform on crime outcomes: greater political representation of 
disadvantaged groups in elected office.  
Our paper makes three major contributions. First, we find strong and 
surprising evidence that political representation is an important means of 
providing voice to disadvantaged groups within the criminal justice system. The 
introduction of mandated political representation for women leads to a large and 
statistically significant increase in the documented number of crimes against 
women. We argue that this is good news for women’s empowerment: 
considerable evidence suggests that this rise is primarily due to higher reporting, 
rather than an increase in the actual incidence of crime. Second, we shed light on 
the political architecture that maximizes female voice. It is the presence of women 
in the broad base of political representatives, rather than in leadership positions at 
higher levels of governance per se, that generates a more powerful impact on 
reporting of crimes. Finally, our work highlights how biases in reporting may lead 
to misleading interpretation of the underlying reality with respect to crime.  
Reporting issues have long been regarded as a serious shortcoming of developing 
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country crime data (Soares, 2004). Our work illustrates this in a concrete and 
important context – albeit with favorable consequences.  
 How could political representatives from disadvantaged groups affect their 
crime outcomes? For one, members of a minority group are likely to have 
different preferences with regard to policy formulation and implementation, since 
their life experiences would give them a different perspective on justice.1 In turn, 
this could influence the functioning of the police or law enforcement agencies, 
which may now be more responsive to the concerns of the disadvantaged groups. 
Second, the presence of minority group individuals in public office could alter the 
nature of interaction between the advantaged and disadvantaged groups, by 
changing perceptions or the degree of social bias against the latter.2 Finally, 
observing members of their own group in positions of public office could change 
the attitudes and self-confidence of the disadvantaged group.3 In a broader sense, 
political representatives from disadvantaged groups could reduce injustice 
because they help to articulate the voice of their group members, as described by 
Hirschman (1970).  
 In practice, accurately measuring the impact of minority group public 
officials on crime outcomes is difficult, because the assignment of minority group 
members to particular positions is often endogenous to the outcomes of interest.  
For instance, police officers of either race may be assigned to a particular locality 
                                                     
1 As the recent U.S. Supreme Court appointee Sonia Sotomayor observed, “…Our experiences as 
women or people of color affect our decisions...Hence, one must accept the proposition that a 
difference there will be by the presence of women or people of color on the bench. Personal 
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see.” (Sotomayor, 2002). 
2 For instance, in the U.S. context, the U.S. Kerner Commission (1968) endorsed the use of a 
mixed race police force as a tool to tackle law and order issues and inter-racial tensions.  In India, 
Beaman et al (2009) demonstrate that the perceptions of women as leaders become more positive 
after men are exposed to women in leadership roles. 
3 Jensen and Oster (2009) show that this role model effect is quite strong in India: exposure to 
strong women characters on cable television reduces women’s reported tolerance for domestic 
violence and increases their decision-making authority in the household. La Ferrara et al (2008) 
also show strong role model effects of television characters on Brazilian women. 
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because of its specific racial composition or crime conditions, which may 
confound any causal inference.4 A minority individual’s election may reflect the 
changing preferences of the electorate, or the changing social status of previously 
disadvantaged groups, which may directly influence crimes committed against 
such groups.  
 In our paper, we are able to address this endogeneity issue by taking 
advantage of a unique, countrywide policy experiment in India. In 1993, a 
constitutional amendment made it mandatory for Indian states to set aside one-
third of all positions in local government councils for women.5 The amendment 
also mandated reservation for other marginalized groups in proportion to their 
population ratio (members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes).6  It is one 
of the largest such experiments implemented in the political arena.7 Our analysis 
exploits the fact that the legislation, which significantly increased female and 
lower caste representation in local leadership positions across India, was 
implemented at varying dates across Indian states. We can thus construct 
difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of political representation for 
women and lower castes on crimes against them. 
                                                     
4 For instance, while the policy of a mixed race police force has been widely implemented in the 
United States, the evidence on how it has affected crime outcomes is mixed.  See Donohue and 
Levitt (2001a) for details. 
5 This represents a substantial increase in the representation of women in political office. For 
instance, in state legislatures where there are no such mandates, only 5% of state legislators were 
women over the period 1985-2007. A proposal to extend such one-third political representation to 
women in state and national legislatures is under consideration by the Indian parliament. 
6 The Scheduled Castes are communities that have historically been at the bottom of the Hindu 
caste hierarchy; they suffered systematic economic and social discrimination including being 
considered “untouchable.” Scheduled Tribes include communities that have traditionally been 
outside the Hindu caste system. 
7 A number of countries, including Rwanda, Tanzania, Sierra Leone and the Philippines, now have 
mandated quotas for women’s representation in national or subnational elected bodies (see 
http://www.quotaproject.org for details). Several European political parties and governments in 
some Latin American countries have minimum quotas in their candidate lists (Norris, 2001). See 
Pande and Ford (2011) for a comprehensive review of the effects of female leadership quotas on a 
range of outcomes.    
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We find that the introduction of mandated political representation for 
women leads to a large and statistically significant increase in the number of 
reported crimes against women. Across all categories, documented crimes against 
women rose by 44%, while rapes per capita rose by 23% and kidnapping of 
women showed a 13% increase. These results are robust to the inclusion of a host 
of controls for economic, demographic and political variables, the strength of the 
police force and state-specific time trends. We note that there is no significant 
effect on any categories of crime not specifically targeted against women – such 
as kidnapping of men, crimes against property or crimes against public order. This 
strongly suggests that there is no overall deterioration in law and order conditions 
or policy changes other than the political representation that are driving our 
results. These findings are somewhat surprising, and potentially distressing.   
In considering possible explanations, one obvious hypothesis is that 
crimes against women rose sharply because of a backlash against women by those 
who resent greater female political power (the retaliation hypothesis). This 
explanation, while plausible, runs somewhat counter to the increased (if gradual) 
acceptance of women in the public arena in India, as documented by Beaman et al 
(2009).  Besides, it seems equally plausible that a woman leader would deter 
potential criminals, since she is likely to be more sympathetic to women’s 
concerns.  Alternatively, it could be the case that greater participation in public 
life exposes women to situations where potential criminals have the opportunity 
to harm them (the increased crime opportunities). 
On the other hand, the surge in reported crimes may simply reflect 
improvements in reporting rather than a rise in actual crimes (the reporting 
hypothesis).  The presence of women leaders could influence reporting of crimes 
against women in several ways. First, it could make the police more responsive to 
crimes against women.  Further, women victims who encounter more sympathetic 
women leaders and (hence) more responsive police would be more encouraged to 
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report crimes.  In other words, thinking about the incentives of the police and 
victims suggests that the rise in documented crimes against women may actually 
be good news: the observed increase in crime could be driven by greater reporting 
of crimes by victims and greater recording of such reports by the police -- rather 
than the actual occurrence of more crimes. Further analysis of our data offers 
several pieces of evidence that support this “good news” reporting hypothesis 
over the “bad news” retaliation or increased crime opportunities hypothesis. 
For one, we find evidence of greater police responsiveness to crimes 
against women after the reservation policy was implemented. The number of 
arrests increases significantly, particularly for cases dealing with kidnapping of 
women, with no decline in the quality of police effort.8 This has likely encouraged 
more reporting by women victims. Survey data on interactions with police show 
both a higher degree of satisfaction and lower bribes paid by women when their 
village council was headed by a woman.  
Second, for crimes where reporting biases are expected to be minimal, 
such as murders or suicides of women, we find no significant increases after the 
introduction of women’s political reservation.9 Data from a government report 
show no differences in women’s freedom of mobility and interaction with 
strangers between villages with male and female leaders. If backlash against 
women were driving the story, we would expect to see increases in violent crime, 
or at least in restrictions to women’s mobility in women-headed villages.   
Third, women’s exposure to potential crime situations would be a function 
of the time they spend outside their home.  Using women’s labor force 
participation as a measure of such exposure, we find little support for the 
increased crime opportunities hypothesis. There has been hardly any movement 
                                                     
8 The quality of police effort is measured by the percentage of cases where the prima facie 
evidence for arrests was upheld by a magistrate. 
9 Deaths are hard to hide, irrespective of the reasons.   
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in women’s labor force participation in India since the early 1990s, both in rural 
and urban areas.   
Fourth, we compare changes in crime rates against females across districts 
with varying levels of women’s empowerment (proxied by sex ratios and female 
literacy rates) as we would expect the potential “backlash” effect to be lower in 
places where women are more empowered. We find that the rise in documented 
crimes after reservation was implemented was larger in places where women are 
more literate to begin with, a finding inconsistent with a “backlash” interpretation. 
Further, we find that the number of years since the reform has a non-linear effect 
on crimes against women: crime rates increase the most in the first few years, but 
they tend to decrease with greater length of exposure to the reform. This evidence 
is consistent with the interpretation that increased police (and possibly victim) 
responsiveness to women leaders resulted in a deterrence effect on potential 
criminals against women, in the long run. 
 Finally, we find very similar effects of mandated representation for low 
castes in local councils, namely a significant increase in documented crimes 
specifically targeted on the basis of caste identity.  
Having established that mandated political representation for women 
results in a large increase in reporting of crimes against them, we now address an 
important related question: At what level of governance does political 
representation have a greater impact? We exploit a specific feature of the 
mandated representation system in India: in addition to village presidents, as well 
as village and district council member positions, one-third of district council 
chairperson positions were also reserved for women, by rotation across districts.  
Using district-level crime data, we can compare districts with and without women 
chairpersons to estimate the marginal effect of having a woman district 
chairperson, over the cumulative impact of all the lower level representatives 
mentioned earlier. We find that the bulk of the impact on crime comes from the 
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latter set of women representatives, rather than female district chairpersons. Our 
results imply that the presence of women representatives at the lowest level of 
governance, where they have greatest proximity to potential crime victims, is 
more important in giving voice to women than their presence in higher-level 
leadership positions. 
Our paper brings together two streams of literature in political economy, 
crime and development. A few papers have examined crimes against specific 
sections of society (African Americans: Donohue and Levitt, 2001a) or against 
women (in Africa: Miguel, 2005; in India: Sekhri and Storeygard, 2010; in the 
US: Stevenson and Wolfers, 2006; Aizer and Dal Bo, 2009; Iyengar, 2009; Aizer, 
2010),10 but none have examined the role of political power of minorities on 
crime outcomes against them.  There is also an extensive literature on the socio-
economic determinants of crime, ranging from local inequality and economic 
shocks to peer effects and family structure.11  A specific policy measure, whose 
impact on crime has been widely examined, is increased police hiring (Di Tella 
and Schargrodsky, 2004; Levitt, 1997; Draca, Machin and Witt, 2011).  
A second stream of literature has examined the effect of increased political 
representation for minority groups on policy making and attitudes.12 Many of the 
                                                     
10 Miguel (2005) studies the effect of economic shocks on witch-killing; Sekhri and Storeygard 
(2010) looks at the effects of natural disasters on crimes against women; Donohue and Levitt 
(2001a) examine the link between the racial profile of police offers and the racial pattern of 
arrests. Stevenson and Wolfers (2006) study the impact of divorce laws on violence against 
women, Aizer and Dal Bo (2009) investigate the effect of prosecution no-drop policies on 
reporting of domestic violence, while Aizer (2010) examines the effect of women’s relative 
wages. Iyengar (2009) examines the effect of mandatory arrest laws for domestic violence, and 
finds that it leads to greater under-reporting of less serious incidents, and consequently a rise in the 
number of homicides. 
11 See, among others, Kelly (2000); Donohue and Levitt (2001b); Bloch and Rao (2002); 
Demombynes and Ozler (2005); Fafchamps and Minten (2006). 
12 Most studies find significant positive effects of women or women-friendly leaders on female-
oriented policies (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Powley, 2007; Washington, 2008; Clots-
Figueras, 2011), as well as improved attitudes towards women leaders (Beaman et al, 2009). 
Similarly increased representation of disadvantaged castes in political office has been found to 
bring greater benefits for these castes (Pande, 2003; Besley et al, 2007; Bardhan et al, 2010). A 
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studies analyzing the Indian case compare outcomes across villages reserved for a 
female (or minority) council president and those that are not; i.e. they do not 
estimate the impact of increased representation among council members of the 
village council but examine only the effect of the village council leader.13 Our 
study, in contrast, focuses precisely on the impact of the change in the 
composition of local councils by comparing crime rates before and after the 
implementation of reservation across Indian states. We also consider the effects of 
the identity of council leaders at the district level.14 We find that having a female 
district council head has a much smaller marginal effect, compared to the overall 
effect of increased mandated representation of women among the members of the 
councils.   
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides institutional 
details of the criminal justice system and mandated political representation in 
India, focusing specifically on the reasons for the variation in policy 
implementation dates across Indian states. Section 3 describes our data and 
empirical strategy, and Section 4 presents our main results. Section 5 discusses 
possible interpretations of these results, and presents evidence to distinguish 
between the reporting and the retaliation hypotheses. Section 6 examines the 
effect of the reservation of district leadership positions for women, and Section 7 
concludes.    
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
few recent studies, however, have challenged these findings (Rajaraman and Gupta, 2010; 
Bardhan et al, 2010; Dunning and Nilekani, 2010). 
13 The empirical strategy of these studies, which relies on the cross-sectional variation in the 
reservation status of the council leader position, does not permit the estimation of the impact of 
increased representation among council members as one-third of member positions are reserved 
for women in all village councils. 
14 Since village level crime data are not available, we are unable to examine the impact of having a 
female leader at the village council level. 
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2. Mandated Political Representation of Women and Disadvantaged Castes 
in India 
2.1 Women’s Socio-Economic Status and Political Representation 
Women, as well as Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs), are 
particularly disadvantaged sections of Indian society. Women were significantly 
under-represented in political institutions in India, accounting for only 10% of the 
membership of national legislatures in 2009. Over the period 1985-2007, only 
5.5% of state legislators on average were women. Women were also significantly 
disadvantaged in terms of human development. In 2007, India was ranked 114 out 
of 182 countries on the Gender Development Index of the UNDP and had only 
940 women for every 1000 men in the 2011 census. The Economist magazine 
estimated the number of “missing women” in India to be greater than 100 million 
in 2009. Only 65% of women in India were literate in 2011, compared with 82% 
of men. Similarly, the literacy rates for SCs and STs were 55% and 47% 
respectively in 2001, compared to the nationwide average of 65%. Previous 
studies have also documented that members of the SCs and STs have significantly 
lower access to public goods such as health and education facilities (Banerjee and 
Somanathan, 2007). 
 
2.2 Mandated Political Representation in Local Councils 
In April 1993, the 73rd Amendment to the Indian constitution came into force. 
This Act required each state to set up a three-tier system of local government, 
comprising village, intermediate and district level governance bodies, collectively 
known as the Panchayati Raj.15 All members of these local bodies were to be 
directly elected by the people every five years, and the Act provided for the 
establishment of State Election Commissions to conduct such elections. Twenty-
                                                     
15 Certain small states were required to set up only two-tier systems of local government. 
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nine areas of administration, including decisions over health and education 
services, roads, sanitation and other local services were to be devolved to these 
local government bodies. State Finance Commissions were set up to provide 
recommendations on revenue-sharing and making grants to these local 
government institutions. The Act thus provided for a considerable degree of 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralization to the local bodies.16 
Two further provisions were made to strengthen the representation of 
political minorities in these local bodies. At least one-third of all council seats at 
the village, intermediate (sub-district) or district level were required to be filled 
by women, and seats were also to be reserved for SC and ST communities in 
proportion with their population in the village, sub-district or district level.  The 
positions of chairpersons of these local bodies were also to be reserved for women 
and members of the SCs and STs. The chairperson reservations would function by 
rotation, i.e. in each election cycle, one-third of the districts would have their 
chairperson position reserved for women, and another set of districts would have 
this reservation in the next election cycle. Similar provisions were made for urban 
local bodies as well. 
All states amended existing laws or passed new laws to be compliant with 
the 73rd Amendment within one year.17 Elections were eventually held by all 
states, though there is considerable variation in the timing of elections across 
states. Of the many components of the new law, the most salient effects on crime 
are likely to come from the change in the gender (and caste) composition of local 
                                                     
16 The village-level governing bodies (Gram Panchayats) have been known to exist in India since 
ancient times. However, their real power, effectiveness and representativeness have varied 
considerably over time. Ghatak and Ghatak (2002) argue that prior to the 1990s, the Panchayati 
Raj was not generally effective: elections were not held, and the Panchayats did not assume any 
active role. 
17 The exceptions are Delhi, which has passed no Panchayati Raj legislation, Jammu & Kashmir 
which did not explicitly pass legislation but amended the state laws to be in compliance, and the 
small states of Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya, which were not required to comply with this 
constitutional provision. 
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government councils. Law and order was not on the list of functions to be 
devolved to local governments. Fiscal decentralization also has not gone very far, 
with most of local governments’ revenue still coming from grants from the state.  
 
2.3. Variation in the Timing of Local Government Elections across States 
Our main measure of political representation is an indicator for when 
marginalized sections of society are given political representation in a particular 
state. In the case of women, this indicator equals one in years following the first 
local government election which implemented the “not less than one-third” 
reservation scheme for women representatives. As Table II shows, the date of this 
first election varies considerably across the major states of India. 
There are three main reasons for the variation in election timing across 
states. First, several states already had a system of local government even before 
the enactment of the 73rd Amendment. In many of these cases, the state 
government waited for the term of office of incumbent local officials to expire 
before conducting fresh elections in compliance with the 73rd Amendment. On the 
other hand, several states chose to incorporate the provisions regarding women’s 
representation into their own state laws even before the constitutional amendment 
came into effect. This was because they were aware of the impending legislation 
due to the long process of amending the Constitution,18 and had elections for local 
bodies scheduled as per their existing system. For instance, West Bengal made 
major amendments to their state-level legislation to provide reservation for 
women and SCs and STs in the 1993 election, once the passage of the 
constitutional amendment was imminent. Kerala made a similar change to its law 
in 1991. Other states had unilaterally implemented reservation for women 
                                                     
18 The 73rd Amendment Act was introduced in the national parliament in 1991, after two earlier 
failed attempts. After some debate, the bill was passed in December 1992. Thereafter, it needed to 
be ratified by a majority of the states, and finally came into effect in April 1993. 
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(Karnataka) or SCs and STs (Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh) long before the 
constitutional amendment. We can, of course, control explicitly for the presence 
of a pre-scheduled local government election, but since all our regressions include 
state fixed effects, we expect this characteristic to be captured by the state fixed 
effect. 
A second reason for variation in election timing is due to lawsuits 
challenging certain aspects of PR implementation. For instance, elections in Bihar 
were delayed due to a lawsuit challenging the proposed reservations for Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs) which had not been explicitly mandated by the 
constitutional amendment. These can be regarded as reasonably exogenous factors 
in causing the delay. 
A third reason is potentially more endogenously determined: some states 
delayed the elections due to budgetary constraints or other unspecified reasons. 
Assam is one example of this. The state had elections in 1992, and therefore 
should have had its first PR-compliant elections in 1997, but the elections were 
conducted only in December 2001. The second round of elections was also 
delayed, taking place in December 2007, rather than in December 2006. However, 
our main results are robust to the exclusion of any specific state. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy 
3.1 Crime Procedures in India 
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides the basis for the criminal justice system 
in India. This code specifies that all information given to the police must be 
included in a written report by the police officer, read and signed by the 
informant. After this “First Information Report” (FIR) has been filed, the police 
are required to investigate the crime, and maintain detailed police diaries of the 
progress of the investigation. During such investigation, the police may question 
or arrest any suspects. 
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Under the habeas corpus requirements of Indian law, all arrested persons 
must be produced before a magistrate and charged with a specific crime within 24 
hours or be released. The police must deliver to the magistrate a report which 
details the results of the investigation, and whether the accused has been arrested 
and/or released on bail. Based on this report, the magistrate makes a decision of 
whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. If he so 
rules, a formal chargesheet is prepared, detailing the offence with which the 
accused is charged. If the magistrate feels that the police report does not provide 
sufficient grounds on which to frame a charge, the case is dismissed at that point. 
The fraction of cases in which the magistrate upholds the charges (the 
“chargesheeting” rate) therefore reflects in part the quality of the investigation 
carried out by the police; this will be a variable we will use in the empirical 
analysis. 
 
3.2. Data on Crime and Police Activity 
We obtained data on the reported number of crimes at the district and state level 
from various issues of the “Crime in India” publications of the National Crime 
Records Bureau (NCRB) at the Ministry of Home Affairs, for the period 1985-
2007. These data come from the first stage of the criminal justice system, namely 
the filing of FIRs with the police.19 We also have annual data on the number of 
arrests made for each crime category, as well as the chargesheeting rate.20 
Our main variable of interest is crimes against women. These include the 
following crime categories: rape, kidnapping of women and girls, dowry deaths, 
                                                     
19 The Criminal Procedure Code of India divides all crimes into two categories: (i) cognizable – 
which are dealt by the Police, and in which a police officer may arrest a person with or without a 
warrant and (ii) non-cognizable – which are generally left to be pursued by the affected parties 
themselves in Courts. Only cognizable crimes are reported in the NCRB publications.  
20 We do not analyze later processes in the criminal justice system, such as the number of 
convictions obtained, because long delays in the Indian judicial system mean that trials for crimes 
committed in one year may be held only several years later. 
15 
 
sexual harassment, molestation, cruelty by husbands or relatives, importation of 
women and girls, prostitution, pornography, giving and receiving dowry and sati 
(widow-burning). The reporting system for these crimes changes over time, as the 
NCRB started reporting additional crime categories separately. For instance, only 
rape and kidnapping of women were reported in the period before 1995, while 
other categories such as dowry death, molestation, sexual harassment and cruelty 
by husband or relatives started being recorded in 1995. Importation of women and 
girls was included in 2001. In all our regressions, we include year fixed effects to 
control for such nationwide changes in reporting. We analyze separately the 
specific crime categories of rape and kidnapping of women and girls, which are 
consistently reported over a longer time period.  
We also examine crimes against SCs and STs, which are recorded 
separately by the NCRB starting in 1992, and crimes which are not gender-
specific, such as property crimes or crimes against public order. It is interesting to 
see that crimes against women follow a very different national trend compared to 
other violent crimes (Figure I). The incidence of murders and riots shows a 
secular decline in the period after 1990, while the documented incidence of rapes 
has steadily increased.  
The empirical analysis uses many control variables and additional 
outcomes at the state level, the sources for which are listed in Appendix 1. These 
include economic variables, such as state GDP levels, police strength, 
demographic variables (female-male ratio, literacy rates, urbanization), and 
political variables such as the presence of a female chief executive in the state. 
We also examine survey data on the quality of interactions with the police from 
two sources. First, we present some evidence from the Public Affairs Centre’s 
Millennial Survey, an India-wide household survey which aims to assess the 
16 
 
functioning of a range of public services in 2000.21 We supplement this with data 
on citizen perceptions of the impact of local leaders on police behavior, based on 
household-level interviews from the State of the Nation Survey (Centre for the 
Study of Developing Societies, 2009). Our data on the dates of the first local 
election with one-third representation of women comes from several different 
sources, summarized in Appendix 1.22  
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
We conduct the analysis for the 17 major states of India over the period 1985-
2007.23 Table I provides the summary statistics for the crime data used in our 
analysis. To gauge the impact of political representation, we run state-level 
regressions of crimes rates (number of crimes per 1000 people) on our measure of 
political representation. Our base specification is the following: 
(1)                       ln ( Cst/Pst ) = αs + βt + fDst + d’Xst + εst 
where  is the number of crimes in state s in year t, Pst is the population in state 
 and year , αs is a fixed effect for state s, βt is a fixed effect for year t, Dst is a 
                                                     
21 The Millennial Survey analysis was conducted while one of the authors was an intern with the 
Public Affairs Centre (a non-governmental organization) in spring 2003. For further description of 
the survey, see Beaman et al (2010). 
22 In some cases, elections were held without implementing the provisions of the Panchayati Raj 
amendment fully. For instance, Uttar Pradesh had considerably less than 33% of women in local 
councils in the elections of 1995 and 2000. In a few cases where elections for village councils and 
district councils are held at different times, we have taken the reform date to be the date of district 
council elections. Our results are unchanged if we use the date for village council elections as the 
reform date. 
23 The states included in the study are the large states of India, which account for 97% of the total 
population and 98% of total crimes reported: Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, 
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, 
Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. Three new states—Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand and Uttarakhand—were carved out in 2001, from Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh respectively. All our analysis is conducted by merging these newly created states with 
their original states, for the sake of comparability of sample units over time. All of these split 
states carried over the PR legislation from their parent states, but this aggregation can sometimes 
cause measurement error in our explanatory variable: for instance, Bihar conducted local elections 
in 2001 and 2006, but Jharkhand has not conducted a single PR election yet.  
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dummy variable that equals one in years including and following the first election 
with political representation for a given minority group in state s, and  is a set 
of state-time varying controls. The coefficient of interest, f, captures the effect of 
reservation for women on crimes against women.  All standard errors are 
clustered at the state level, to account for possible correlated shocks to state-level 
crimes over time. 
Our specification controls for a range of factors that might affect crime 
against women in a given time and place. Literacy rates could affect awareness of 
victims’ legal rights and influence reporting of crimes. Per capita income has also 
been found to be associated with higher probabilities of reporting crime (Soares, 
2004). Crime is typically higher in urban areas relative to rural ones. Other studies 
have documented that high male-female ratios result in increased rates of crime 
(Edlund et al, 2007). Perhaps states which implemented reforms earlier were 
those where the Chief Minister was a woman, and so we might mistakenly 
attribute the effect of a higher-level woman representative to a lower-level one. 
We explicitly control for all of these variables in our regressions. Finally, we also 
include measures of the size of the state police force as a control for varying 
levels of commitment to crime deterrence across states, though this might in fact 
be the channel through which political representation affects crime. 
A further concern is that the timing of policy changes may be endogenous 
to the trends in crime. In addition to including state and time fixed effects, we also 
control for state-specific linear time trends.  
 
4. Political Representation and Crimes against Disadvantaged Groups 
4.1 Crimes against Women 
We find that political representation for women is associated with a large and 
significant increase in the reported crimes against women. Table III shows the 
stX
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coefficients on the post-reform dummy Dst, when we run specification (1) for a 
range of crime categories and with a variety of controls. The coefficient on the 
post-reform dummy is 0.365 for overall crimes against women (per 1000 
population), which corresponds to a 44% increase in reported crimes against 
women after the implementation of political reservation (column 1). A large 
positive effect is also confirmed in specific types of crimes against women: the 
coefficient on the post-reform dummy is 0.206 for rapes and 0.125 for kidnapping 
of women, which works out to a 23% increase in rapes and a 13% increase in the 
kidnapping of women (estimates from column 3).  
The size and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients are little 
affected by the inclusion of a large number of demographic, economic and 
political controls (column 2), and controls for the strength of police in the state at 
that time (column 3). This suggests that the estimated effect is not due to a policy 
change in policing, but to the change in the identity of the politician.  
The results are practically unchanged when we control for female literacy 
rather than overall literacy (column 4). The inclusion of state-specific linear 
trends in addition to demographic, political and economic controls (columns 5 and 
6) affects little the estimated effect of mandated representation for women, though 
the coefficients are somewhat smaller in magnitude. We should note that this 
specification controls for all linearly varying state-level variables, including any 
linear effect of representation of women (and therefore might be “over-
controlling” for the effects of the reform).   
Our results are robust to the exclusion of any specific state, which means 
that the results are not driven by specific states which might have unusual 
characteristics. These include Jammu & Kashmir (which has a significant military 
presence due to a long-running conflict between India and Pakistan), Karnataka 
(which was the first state to implement women's reservations) and Uttar Pradesh 
(the last state to implement women's reservation). Figure II shows the coefficients 
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obtained from a specification like (1) where the post-reform dummy is replaced 
by a series of dummies for one to five or more years since the reform, along with 
a similar number of pre-reform dummies. The figure shows a considerable 
increase in the number of documented crimes against women, starting at the date 
when women’s reservation is implemented.24  
 
4.2 Crimes Against Men and Gender-Neutral Crimes  
Could the increase in reported crimes against women be simply a part of an 
overall surge in documented crimes after mandated political representation of 
women? This could occur if the entry of inexperienced female policymakers led 
to a general decline in law and order or if political reservation were associated 
with other concurrent reforms such as changes to reporting rules, policing strategy 
or overall economic growth or inequality trends.25 We therefore  examine the 
impact of political reservation on other categories of crime, where the victims are 
not necessarily women. One such category is the kidnapping of men and boys, 
which is reported separately from 1988 onwards. We also show results for other 
crime categories that do not have any overt gender component: crimes against 
property (robberies and burglaries), crimes against public order (riots and arson) 
and economic crimes (counterfeiting, cheating and breach of trust). None of these 
crime categories show any statistically significant relationship with the 
implementation of women’s political reservations (Table IV).  
 This makes us more confident that the results of Table III are indeed 
capturing the effect of women’s political representation, rather than any other 
concurrent reforms that might have been implemented, or an overall increase in 
crime as a result of having less experienced female leaders.  
                                                     
24 We further discuss the long term, cumulative impact of women’s representation on crime 
outcomes in section 5.4 
25 For the impact of overall economic growth or rising inequality on crime in India, see Prasad 
(2008) and Charmarbagwala and Sharma (2008). 
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4.3 Crimes Against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes 
Since the Panchayati Raj policy provided for the mandated representation of SCs 
and STs in local councils, we examine whether documented crimes against these 
communities also increased after reservation was implemented. The case of 
SCs/STs is slightly different from the mandated representation of women. First, 
these communities already had mandated representation in the state legislature (in 
proportion to their population share). A priori, we do not know whether the 
already existing representation at the higher level would increase or decrease the 
impact of greater representation at the lower level of government. Second, data on 
crimes against SCs/STs are only available from 1992 onwards. In order to ensure 
that there are sufficient pre-reform observations, we restrict our analysis only to 
states which implemented the Panchayati Raj provisions for SCs/STs in 1995 or 
later. Further, some states do not have any STs in their population, which restricts 
our sample size for these regressions. 
Similar to the results for women, we find a significant increase in the 
documented crimes against SCs after these groups obtain mandated representation 
in local councils (Table V). In particular, the largest increase is in crimes that are 
prosecuted under the Prevention of Atrocities Act, which specifically includes 
offences committed against SCs by non-SCs (including stripping, insulting, 
forced labor and sexual exploitation). As before, we show results controlling for a 
range of demographic, economic and political controls (columns 2-3). The results 
on overall crimes against SCs, in particular those classified as “atrocities,” are 
robust to all these specifications.26 Interestingly, we do not see significant 
increases in crimes which are not caste-specific (e.g. murder or rape, where the 
victims might be targeted for reasons other than their caste).  This lends greater 
                                                     
26 These results are robust to using a tobit specification, as well as using non-logged crime 
variables. 
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weight to our hypothesis that it is political representation of such communities 
which is driving higher reporting of such caste-related crimes.  
We do not find any significant results of political representation for STs 
on crimes committed against them (Table V, columns 4-6). This could be because 
of poorer data availability, or perhaps the inability of STs to mobilize as 
effectively as SCs. Other studies on STs have also found that mandated political 
representation for STs has not resulted in greater access to primary schools or 
other types of infrastructure (Krishnan, 2007; Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007).  
 
5.  Interpreting the Results: More Crime or More Documentation of Crime?  
5.1 Potential Effects of a Change in Leader Identity 
We outline a framework similar to Donohue and Levitt (2001a) that considers the 
incentives of three parties relevant to a crime situation: criminals, victims and the 
policing authority. First, a potential criminal decides whether to commit a crime 
or not.  Next, when a crime occurs, the crime must be reported.  This stage 
requires both that the victim comes forward to report the crime and that the police 
documents the victim’s report.  Finally, for a crime that is so documented or 
reported, the police must decide how much time and effort to devote to 
investigating the crime and bringing the criminal to justice.  
 
 
 
 
In what ways does increased female representation in local government 
affect the behavior of agents at each of these stages above? We examine this 
question working backwards, from stage 3 to stage 1, since changes in behavior of 
the police would influence behavior of victims and criminals in the earlier stages. 
Stage 1: 
Crime Occurrence 
(Criminals) 
Stage 2: 
Crime Reporting 
(Victims) 
Stage 3: 
Crime Recording & 
Investigation (Police) 
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The presence of women leaders makes it more likely that police are responsive to 
crimes against women, i.e. that they record and investigate crimes against women 
more often in Stage 3. The presence of female leaders at the local level might also 
induce the police to be more sympathetic towards female victims, either because 
their attitudes towards women undergo a change after observing female political 
leaders,27 or because these local leaders have the ability to highlight poor 
behaviour by the police to higher level officials or the local press. We examine 
the evidence on police responsiveness to crimes against women in detail in 
section 5.4 
If the police take women’s grievances more seriously, victims would be 
more encouraged to report crimes in stage 2.  Further, the presence of female local 
leaders can directly affect crime reporting by women, independent of police 
responsiveness, through a “role-model” effect: Having more sympathetic women 
village councillors could give female victims greater self-confidence and a lower 
tolerance for being badly treated (the reporting effect).28 We should note that most 
victims of physical or sexual violence do not come forward with their 
experiences: the National Family Health Survey of 2005-06 (NFHS-3) reports that 
66% of women who experienced domestic violence did not tell anyone about such 
incidents.29  
These effects of greater female representation in local government on the 
behavior of the police and victims would likely deter potential criminals from 
committing crimes in stage 1. This would lead to a decline in the actual number of 
crimes against women (the deterrence effect). However, greater political power 
for women may result in an increase in crimes against them for other reasons. For 
                                                     
27 See Beaman et al (2009) for evidence of improved attitudes towards women in places which 
experienced women local leaders. 
28 Jensen and Oster (2009) document significant changes in women’s autonomy and tolerance for 
domestic violence after observing women characters on television. 
29 This question was not asked in previous rounds of the NFHS, hence we are unable to document 
whether the propensity to seek help for domestic violence changes over time. 
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instance, if men are resentful of being mandated to elect women into leadership 
positions, they may commit more crimes against women – either as a way of 
simply expressing resentment, or as a calculated strategy to intimidate women 
leaders and voters (the retaliation effect). Alternatively, if more women are 
encouraged to work outside the home or undertake more travel following 
women’s political representation, then they may be more exposed to potential 
criminals as a result (opportunistic crimes effect).  
In sum, there are several potential channels through which mandated 
political representation for women (and minorities) can influence both actual 
crimes and reported crimes. First, the presence of female politicians should induce 
the police to be more active in investigating crimes against women. Even with no 
change in the actual number of crimes committed, documented crimes against 
women are likely to increase -- both because of women victims being more likely 
to report crimes, and police being more likely to record such reports. Actual 
incidence of crime can decrease in response to changes in police and victims’ 
behavior (the deterrence effect).  However, the actual incidence of crimes may 
increase if women’s greater participation in public life exposes them to crime 
(increased crime opportunities effect) or if their political power triggers strong 
resentment among men (retaliation effect). In the following sections, we present 
evidence on each of these potential effects. 
 
5.2 Are Police More Likely to Investigate Crimes and Make Arrests? 
One of the potential channels outlined in our framework is the higher probability 
of punitive action against those who commit crimes against women as a result of 
increased female representation. We examine data on the number of arrests and 
chargesheeting rates to shed some light on this issue. Our data on police activity 
shows that the number of arrests per 1000 people for crimes against women 
increases by a nearly 30% after women’s reservation is implemented (Table VI, 
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column 1). Arrests for rape also show an increase of 12%, and arrests for 
kidnapping of women increase by a statistically significant 18% (columns 2-3).  
For all other crimes taken together, the impact is slightly smaller (at 25%) and the 
impact on arrests for kidnapping of males is in fact negative (Table VI, columns 
4-5). We also examine the results for the ratio of arrests to total crimes.  While 
there is only a small increase in this ratio for crimes against women when 
compared to this ratio for all other crimes, it must be pointed out that the relative 
increase in the reporting of crimes against women is much greater.  Thus, it is fair 
to conclude that there is no adverse effect on the quantity of police follow-up on 
crimes against women, in the post-reform period.  
Does this increased police arrest activity come at the cost of the quality of 
investigation? We examine the impact of political empowerment of women on 
chargesheeting rates i.e. the fraction of cases in which the police report about the 
crime is held up by a magistrate and results in a formal chargesheet against the 
accused. As shown in columns (8)-(9) of Table VI, political empowerment of 
women has no statistically significant effect on chargesheeting rates.30 Hence, 
there is no evidence of a decline in the quality of police action with increased 
political representation of women either.  
 
5.3 Do Local Leaders Affect Women’s Experience with Law Enforcement 
Officials? 
We begin by noting that previous studies have found the lack of documentation of 
crimes against women by the police to be a serious problem.  Case studies report 
                                                     
30 Chargesheeting rate for crimes against women is computed as the average of the chargesheeting 
rate for the following crime categories: rape, kidnapping of women and girls, dowry deaths, 
molestation, sexual harassment, cruelty by husbands or relatives and importation of girls.  These 
rates are not separately available for other crime categories, hence we cannot report the 
chargesheeting rate for “all crimes other than those against women”.  
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instances of the police characterizing an attempt to record a rape as a method to 
extort money, refusing to record domestic violence because “the husband has a 
right to beat the wife,” and assuming that a missing girl had eloped rather than 
been kidnapped (National Commission for Women, 2003). In a study using decoy 
crime victims, Banerjee et al (2009) find that only 50% of sexual harassment 
cases and 53% of domestic violence cases are registered by the police (when a 
male relative tries to report it on behalf of a female victim), in contrast to 92% of 
break-ins and more than 64% of motorcycle thefts.  
These differences can also be observed when comparing data on recorded 
crimes with those reported in the India Human Development Survey 2005 
(IHDS), which is the first crime victimization survey for India as a whole. For 
instance, 3.9% of households in the IHDS report a theft in the past 12 months, and 
2.5% of households report being attacked or threatened (Desai et al, 2005). 
However, based on the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, only 0.12% 
of all households reported a theft in 2005, and only 0.2% of households report any 
violent crime.31 Similarly, 12% of households in the IHDS reported that 
unmarried girls were “sometimes” or “often” harassed in their neighborhoods, 
compared to only 0.06% of households based on the NCRB data.   
As discussed earlier, the increased female representation in local 
governments may mitigate such lack of documentation of crimes against women 
for multiple reasons. When women victims perceive a woman leader as more 
sympathetic to their concerns, they may become more self-confident as a result of 
seeing other women in political office, hence reducing their tolerance of injustice 
and their reluctance to report crimes.32. If the police were expected to be more 
                                                     
31 Authors’ calculations from NCRB data, assuming an average household size of 5 members. 
Unfortunately the lack of any previous victimization survey prevents us from comparing trends in 
actual crime over time. 
32 We note that the presence of women political representatives does not increase the overall 
strength of the police force or the presence of female police officers, which might be an important 
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responsive to their complaints as a direct consequence of the presence of a local 
female leader, female victims would feel more confident in voicing their 
complaints.  
Data from the nationwide State of the Nation 2009 survey show that local 
leaders are widely perceived to change the degree of responsiveness of the police 
(Table VII, Panel A). First, the survey finds that nearly half the respondents 
identify their village council member or president as being the local influential 
person they would approach for help, if they had a problem to fix (columns 1 to 
4). Second, the presence of a local influential person is believed to greatly 
increase the responsiveness of the police to citizen complaints: the perceived 
likelihood of the police listening sympathetically to a crime victim, and the 
likelihood of follow-up action increase by 10 percentage points (or 63 and 68 
percent respectively) if the victim is accompanied by a local influential person 
(columns 5-8). A separate government survey of elected women representatives 
found that 62% of village-level women leaders had tried to reduce instances of 
domestic violence (Government of India, 2008a, Table 7.20). 
Further, data from the Millennial Survey show that women display greater 
satisfaction in their interactions with the police when they live in villages with a 
female council head (Table VII, panel B).33 Women are slightly more likely to 
approach the police in such villages (columns 1 and 2). While the sample of 
respondents who actually had dealings with the police is relatively small, we do 
find that women in villages with female council heads were significantly more 
likely to say that the police solved their case (column 3) and significantly less 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable in the victim’s decision to approach the police (results not shown). This is not too 
surprising in light of the administrative setting where local councils (village or district) have no 
direct jurisdiction over the police in terms of staffing or salaries. 
33 Since the Millennial Survey is a single cross-section, we cannot estimate the impact of increase 
female presence among village council members, but only the effect of reservation for women of 
the village council head position.  
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likely to pay bribes to the police (column 7). They were also somewhat less likely 
to say that the police refused to register their complaint (column 5). We should 
note that the difference in women’s responses across villages that did and did not 
have women council heads was larger than the difference for men in all these 
cases. These results are indicative of a positive change in police attitudes towards 
crimes against women, in the presence of women leaders. This evidence is also 
consistent with the results on greater police action after women’s political 
representation, as shown in Table VI. 
 
5.4 Do Actual Crimes Increase? 
Given the challenge of separating out actual increases in crime from higher 
reporting/recording of crime, we begin by examining categories of crime where 
the incidence of underreporting is likely to be the least: murders and suicides of 
women (The reason for this is simply that it is relatively hard to hide a dead 
body). If the overall results in Table III were primarily driven by an increase in 
actual crimes committed, we may expect to find some effects in these crime 
categories as well.  
We do not find any increase in overall murder rates after women’s 
political reservation was implemented (Table VIII, column 1). Zooming on 
murders of women, there is also no evidence of an increase following the surge in 
female representation in local governments. Since data on number of murders by 
gender are available only after 1999, we focus only on the four states that enacted 
women’s empowerment after 1999. Though the small sample size means that we 
are unlikely to get statistically significant results, it is nevertheless notable that the 
point estimate for the effects of female political representation is negative for 
murders of women (Table VIII, columns 2-3). We also examined data on murders 
where the motive was stated as love affairs or sexual causes as a proxy for 
murders of women (on the plausible assumption that most victims of such 
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murders are likely to be female); data on motives of murders are available for our 
entire time period. Again, we find no significant impact of women’s reservation 
on the number of such murders or their share in overall murders (Table VIII, 
columns 4-5). We also find no evidence of any statistically significant increase in 
the incidence of female suicides following women’s greater political role (Table 
VIII, columns 6-7).  
Next, we examine the increased crime opportunities hypothesis, i.e. the 
idea that greater exposure situations or locations where crime occurs may be 
driving the observed increases in crimes against women.  One important source of 
such exposure would be women’s labor force participation, which would increase 
their interaction with those outside the home.  It also seems plausible that 
women’s labor force participation would increase over the post-reform period, 
with the opening up of the Indian economy in the early 1990s -- but we find that 
this is not the case. Data from the National Sample Survey (NSS) of India 
indicates that the female labor force participation has remained around 33% in 
rural areas between 1987-88 and 2004-05; in urban areas, the female labor force 
participation rate increased from 16.2% to 17.8% over the same period.34 This 
increase is not correlated with the timing of women’s political representation: we 
find that the increase in female labor force participation and the number of years 
since the Panchayati Raj reforms have a correlation coefficient of 0.06.  
Finally, we assess whether there is any evidence for the retaliation 
hypothesis. We have already documented little change in murders of women 
(Table VIII), but this might be considered a very extreme form of retaliation 
against women – just as suicides may be regarded as an extreme response. 
Nonetheless, if there was actually an increase in crimes committed against 
                                                     
34 These are labor force participation rates for the entire population. Labor force participation rates 
for those aged 15 and above also show similarly small increases. 
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women, it would lead to greater curtailment of their freedoms in places with 
women leaders.  We do not find any evidence for this.  Based on household level 
surveys of over 19,000 respondents across all states of India (Government of 
India, 2008a), a study of women’s role in local governance finds very little 
difference across village units represented by women and men in the fraction of 
women requiring permission to go outside the home, to attend social events, to 
interact with strangers and to send girls to school.35 For instance, 61.5% of women 
who are represented by women councilors reported needing permission to go out 
of their homes; the corresponding figure for women in areas with male 
representatives was 60%. In our district level analysis in Section 6, we also 
consider the district characteristics that are likely to be associated with greater 
retaliation against women.  Examining the interaction effects of characteristics 
such as female literacy and sex ratios with the introduction of political 
reservations for women provides further evidence against the retaliation 
hypothesis.  
Finally, we examine whether there is any evidence for the deterrence 
hypothesis. Here, the fact that we observe an overall increase in documented 
crimes against women suggests that any deterrence effect is outweighed by other 
factors, at least in the short run. What about longer-run effects? We ran a 
specification where we included the number of years since the reform and its 
squared term as regressors, rather than a single post-reform dummy. We find a 
significant negative coefficient on the squared term, suggesting that the rise in the 
number of crimes slows down over time.  In fact the total number of crimes 
against women starts declining 9.5 years after the reform is passed. Similarly, the 
number of rapes per capita is expected to decline 20 years after the reform (results 
available upon request).  This evidence is consistent with the interpretation that in 
                                                     
35 Government of India, 2008a, Table 7.14, page 139. 
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the long run increased police (and possibly victim) responsiveness to women 
leaders deters potential criminals against women, as outlined in section 5.1. 
 
6. Women’s Political Representation: At What Level Does It Matter?  
Beginning with Hirschman (1970), social scientists have recognized the 
importance of voice for the survival and success of any organization, be it a 
country or a firm. However, we know very little about the specific forms of 
representation that maximize effective voice. For instance, in our context, are the 
benefits to the minority community maximized by being represented in more 
influential positions at higher levels of governance, or by large scale 
representation at the lower level? We are able to address this question by using 
the fact that, in addition to village presidents, as well as village and district 
council member positions, one-third of district council chairperson positions in 
India were also reserved for women, by rotation across districts. While all districts 
within a state have an identical (one-third) fraction of their council membership 
reserved for women, they do differ in whether the chairperson position is reserved 
for women. A priori, it is not obvious whether the impact of women district 
chairpersons will be larger or smaller than that of female district council members 
and sub-district level representatives. If district chairpersons have a greater degree 
of influence with local police, their impact on crime may be larger, while if the 
greater proximity of village level leaders to both the police and the victims is a 
major factor, then having a female district chairperson might not have much 
additional impact.36  
                                                     
36 The district is the lowest level at which the NCRB reports crime statistics. 
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We collected data on the reservation status of the district chairperson in 10 
out of our 17 major states.37 We run the following specification, similar to the 
state-level regression in (1): 
 
(2)                ln (Cdt/Pdt ) = ad + bt + gChairPersondt + d’Xdt + fDst + edt        
 
where the dependent variable is the number of crimes per capita in the district (in 
logs). The key independent variable is the dummy variable ChairPersondt which 
equals 1 if the district chairperson post in district d in year t is reserved for 
women, and zero otherwise.  The specification includes district and time fixed 
effects, district level controls for female-male population ratios, literacy rates and 
urbanization, as well as a control for the timing of overall Panchayati Raj reform 
implementation at the state level (Dst). All standard errors are clustered at the 
district level. 
We find that, in any given year, the state-level implementation of local 
council reservations has a much larger effect on documented crimes against 
women, than having the district chairperson post reserved for women (Table IX, 
Panel A, column 1).38 Having a woman district chairperson increases documented 
crimes against women in the district by 4.6%; this estimate is statistically 
insignificant and considerably smaller in magnitude than the coefficient for 
implementing broad-based representation (0.168). This result is important, 
because it shows that when it comes to giving voice (in this case, to female crime 
victims), political representatives who have greater proximity to those whose 
                                                     
37 These states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, 
Rajasthan and West Bengal. The data were obtained by contacting the State Election Commissions 
or the Ministry of Rural Development or Ministry of Panchayati Raj of individual states. 
38 Nevertheless, the presence of a woman district chairperson does have some long-term effect.  
Each additional year a woman has been in the district chairperson position increases the number of 
reported crimes by 3.4%, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The results are 
qualitatively similar if we use a dummy for whether the district ever had a woman chairperson as 
the key explanatory variable (results available upon request). 
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voice needs to be heard is more important than their presence in higher level 
leadership positions.39 It is also consistent with the previously reported evidence 
that it is the village level representative who is most commonly sought for help on 
important matters by villagers, over any other locally influential person including 
higher level political officials (Table VII, Panel A). 
We then explore whether the effect of a district chairperson varies across 
districts where women are more/less empowered.  We use two (relatively crude) 
proxies for status of women – the population ratio of women to men and the 
literacy rate of women in a district. We interact ChairPersondt with these two 
proxies; the results are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table IX, Panel A. In 
districts where women are more empowered, having a woman district chairperson 
is associated with a larger number of documented crimes against women. The 
magnitude of the woman chairperson effect in more progressive districts is 
considerable: Using these coefficients, we compute that for a district in the 75th 
percentile of the female/male ratio or the female literacy rate in our data, the 
marginal impact of having a woman district chairperson raises the reported crimes 
against women by about 8%.  Resistance to, and hence retaliation against, a 
greater public role for women is more likely to happen in places where women’s 
socioeconomic status is relatively low. These findings therefore lend further 
support to our hypothesis that the observed increase in crime is driven by greater 
reporting, rather than the alternative retaliation hypothesis.  They also show that 
district chairpersons have a bigger impact on crime outcomes against women 
when women are more empowered -- although the magnitude of their impact is 
                                                     
39 Our findings here also have policy relevance in the context of domestic violence cases in 
developed countries, where failure of female victims to bring charges against perpetrators is a 
considerable problem (see for instance, New York Times, 2011). Iyengar (2009) also finds that 
high-level policy changes, such as mandatory arrest laws, reduce reporting of domestic violence, 
with adverse consequences on the rate of incidence. 
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still much smaller than that of more proximate, lower level leaders and council 
members. 
Finally, we extend our analysis to consider the effects of having women 
members in the state legislative assembly (MLAs). We should note that women 
are significantly under-represented at these levels of government, where no 
mandated representation rules are in place. In our data set, only 5.5% of the state 
legislators in any given year are female. We run a regression specification similar 
to (1), except that the independent variable of interest is the fraction of female 
MLAs in power at the state level (Table IX, Panel B, column 1).  Since this 
fraction is potentially endogeneous, we instrument for the fraction of women 
MLAs using the fraction of closely contested elections (with winning margin less 
than 5%) where the winner was female.40 We should note that the OLS and IV 
coefficients show a positive relationship between women’s representation and 
reported crime, though none of these coefficients are statistically significant at the 
5% level (Table IX, Panel B, Column 2).  
 
7. Conclusions  
This paper demonstrates that political voice is an important determinant of access 
to justice for socially disadvantaged groups. We provide one of the first 
systematic analyses of the effects of mandated political representation for women 
and low caste groups on crime outcomes against them, using data from the 
Panchayati Raj experiment in India. Furthermore, we shed light on the relative 
effectiveness of alternative forms of political representation for minority 
empowerment.  
                                                     
40 A similar instrument is used by Clots-Figueras (2011) in her analysis of the effects of women 
legislators on public goods outcomes. 
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We find that having female political representation at the local 
government level induces strong positive and significant effects on reporting of 
crimes by women. It also induces greater responsiveness of law enforcement 
officials to crimes against women, as measured by the number of arrests as well 
as the quality of women’s interactions with police. We find a similar result for the 
case of SCs: despite already enjoying mandated representation at higher levels of 
government, we find that representation of SCs in local councils leads to 
increased reporting of crimes where the victims are specifically targeted because 
of their caste. Most of the effects are driven by the increase in broad-based 
representation of women in local government councils at the district and village 
level, rather than women in district leadership positions. Our results are 
particularly relevant in the context of the proposed bill to grant one-third 
representation for women in India’s state and national legislatures.  
Crime against women and under-reporting of such crime is a problem in 
both developing and developed countries. Encouraging victims to report such 
crimes is a crucial first step, both in understanding the magnitude of the problem, 
and in ensuring justice. Our work shows the key role that local women 
representatives can play in facilitating this process. Our insights on the identity of 
local leaders in ensuring access to justice are equally valuable for other racial, 
religious or ethnic minorities. 
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
 
Crimes, arrests, chargesheeting rates, police strength: Annual issues of Crime in 
India, published by the National Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi. 
Suicides: Annual issues of Accidental Deaths and Suicides in India, published by 
the National Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi. 
Population, female-male ratio, literacy rates, urbanization: Census of India 1981, 
1991, 2001. Values for intervening years by interpolation. 
Real per capita GDP at state level: Central Statistical Organization, Ministry of 
Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. 
Dates of local elections: Institute of Social Sciences (1994, 2000); Government of 
India, 2008b. 
Woman Chief Minister dummy: State government websites of respective states 
Survey data from State of the Nation Wave VII, January 2009: State-level means 
obtained from Centre for Developing Societies, New Delhi. 
Survey on interactions with the police: Millennial Survey conducted by the Public 
Affairs Centre, Bangalore, India. 
Dummy for whether District Chairperson post is reserved for women: Obtained 
from State Election Commissions/Ministry of Panchayati Raj/Ministry of 
Rural Development for each state. 
Presence of women in state legislatures: Election reports from Election 
Commission of India. 
 
 
Panel A: Crime data #obs Mean S.D Min Max
Total crimes against women per 1000 women (1985-2007) 391 0.173 0.137 0.001 0.570
Rapes per 1000 women (1985-2007) 391 0.031 0.020 0.001 0.102
Kidnapping of women and girls per 1000 women (1988-2007) 340 0.038 0.031 0.005 0.149
Kidnapping of men and boys per 1000 men (1988-2007) 340 0.010 0.008 0.000 0.045
Murders per 1000 pop (1985-2007) 391 0.035 0.018 0.011 0.150
Crimes against property per 1000 pop (1985-2007) 391 0.446 0.191 0.099 1.087
Crimes against public order per 1000 pop (1985-2007) 391 0.110 0.086 0.000 0.449
Economic crimes per 1000 pop (1985-2007) 391 0.059 0.033 0.019 0.200
Total crimes against SCs per 1000 SC pop (1992-2007) 175 0.171 0.175 0.000 0.766
Civil rights violations of SC per 1000 SC pop (1992-2007) 175 0.008 0.013 0.000 0.080
Atrocities against SCs per 1000 SC pop (1992-2007) 175 0.052 0.067 0.000 0.320
Total crimes against STs per 1000 ST pop (1992-2007) 145 0.084 0.126 0.000 1.031
Civil rights violations of ST per 1000 ST pop (1992-2007) 145 0.003 0.010 0.000 0.087
Atrocities against STs per 1000 ST pop (1992-2007) 145 0.021 0.044 0.000 0.279
Panel B: Police activity
Arrests for crimes against women per 1000 pop (1985-2007) 340 0.351 0.220 0.020 0.929
Arrests for rape per 1000 pop (1988-2007) 340 0.020 0.012 0.004 0.062
Arrests for kidnapping of women per 1000 pop (1988-2007) 340 0.020 0.016 0.000 0.101
Arrests for crimes excluding crimes against women (1988-2007) 340 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.027
Arrests for kidnapping of men per 1000 pop (1988-2007) 340 0.008 0.007 0.000 0.041
Arrests per crime (crimes against women; 1988-2007) 340 1.545 0.388 0.729 2.659
Arrests per crime (crimes excluding crimes against women; 1988-2007) 340 1.491 1.333 0.369 20.042
Chargesheeting rate for crimes against women (1991-2007; %) 289 89.60 7.75 60.50 98.30
Chargesheeting rate for all crimes (1991-2007; %) 289 76.66 10.90 41.50 94.50
Police strength per 1000 population 391 1.541 0.885 0.084 5.923
Fraction of female police officers (1988-2007) 337 0.022 0.020 0.000 0.124
Panel C: Demographic and economic control variables (1985-2007)
Female-male ratio 391 0.937 0.045 0.859 1.070
Proportion of rural population 391 0.748 0.093 0.510 0.919
Proportion literate 391 0.513 0.121 0.273 0.811
Proportion with farming as main activity 391 0.178 0.054 0.021 0.294
Woman Chief Minister (dummy) 391 0.079 0.271 0.000 1.000
Per capita state GDP ('000 rupees) 391 1.674 0.762 0.000 4.239
Table I
Summary Statistics
Year of first election 
with reservation for 
women Number of states
1987 1
1991 1
1992 2
1993 1
1994 2
1995 5
1996 1
2001 2
2002 1
2006 1
Total 17
Table II
Dates of Panchayati Raj Implementation Across States of India
No 
controls
Demographic, 
economic  and 
political controls
Control for 
police 
strength
Control for 
female 
literacy
Control for 
state-
specific 
time trends
Control for state-
specific time 
trends + other 
controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total crimes against women 0.365 * 0.365 ** 0.376 ** 0.375 ** 0.225 ** 0.229 **
per 1000 women [0.190] [0.149] [0.150] [0.147] [0.099] [0.084]
R-squared 0.85 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.95 0.95
Observations 391 391 391 391 391 391
Rapes per 1000 women 0.201 ** 0.199 ** 0.206 ** 0.203 ** 0.147 * 0.106
[0.087] [0.076] [0.083] [0.081] [0.072] [0.078]
R-squared 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.91 0.92
Observations 391 391 391 391 391 391
Kidnapping of women 0.160 ** 0.133 ** 0.125 ** 0.125 ** 0.135 ** 0.115 **
& girls per 1000 women [0.056] [0.049] [0.047] [0.047] [0.059] [0.053]
R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.96
Observations 340 340 340 340 340 340
Demographic & economic controls Y Y Y Y
Control for woman CM Y Y Y Y
Control for police strength Y Y Y
All crime variables are in logs. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets, corrected for clustering at state-level.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Regression for 17 major states and years 1985-2007.
Each cell represents the coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables with
appropriate controls. Post-reform dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections 
with reservations for women.
Demographic & economic controls include literacy, urbanization, female-male ratio, % population in farming and 
real per capita state domestic product. 
See Appendix 1 for crime category definitions.
Women's reservation implemented
Table III
Women's Political Representation and Crimes against Women
Women's Political Representation and Crimes not Targeted Towards Women
No controls
Demographic, 
economic  and 
political controls
Control for 
police strength
(1) (2) (3)
Kidnapping of men & boys 0.005 -0.003 -0.03
per 1000 men [0.135] [0.105] [0.113]
R-squared 0.66 0.68 0.69
Observations 330 330 330
Crimes against property 0.073 0.025 0.026
per 1000 pop [0.073] [0.051] [0.050]
R-squared 0.82 0.86 0.86
Observations 391 391 391
Crimes against public order 0.193 ** 0.124 0.116
per 1000 pop [0.085] [0.075] [0.077]
R-squared 0.89 0.92 0.92
Observations 391 391 391
Economic crimes 0.122 0.104 0.103
per 1000 pop [0.075] [0.062] [0.062]
R-squared 0.7 0.71 0.71
Observations 391 391 391
Demographic & economic controls Y Y
Control for woman CM Y Y
Control for police strength Y
All crime variables are in logs. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets, corrected for clustering at state-level.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Regression for 17 major states and years 1985-2007.
Each cell represents the coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables with
appropriate controls. Post-reform dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections 
with reservations for women.
Demographic & economic controls include literacy, urbanization, female-male ratio, % population 
in farming and real per capita state domestic product.
See Appendix 1 for crime category definitions.
Women's reservation implemented
Table IV
No 
controls
Demographic, 
economic  and 
political 
controls
Control for 
police 
strength
No 
controls
Demographic, 
economic  and 
political 
controls
Control 
for police 
strength
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total crimes against SC/ST 0.066 0.377 0.402 * 0.153 0.141 0.144
per 1000 SC/ST pop [0.440] [0.253] [0.213] [0.307] [0.333] [0.332]
R-squared 0.81 0.86 0.87 0.53 0.61 0.61
Observations 168 168 168 134 134 134
Murders of SC/ST 0.209 0.262 0.306 0.625 0.573 0.583
per 1000 SC/ST pop [0.186] [0.222] [0.241] [0.596] [0.426] [0.434]
R-squared 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.54 0.61 0.62
Observations 146 146 146 103 103 103
Rapes of SC/ST 0.148 0.141 0.141 0.004 -0.252 -0.237
per 1000 SC/ST pop [0.115] [0.160] [0.160] [0.494] [0.447] [0.446]
R-squared 0.79 0.83 0.83 0.68 0.74 0.74
Observations 157 157 157 112 112 112
Atrocities against SC/ST 0.841 ** 0.991 *** 0.991 *** 0.086 0.027 -0.02
per 1000 SC/ST pop [0.328] [0.310] [0.313] [0.365] [0.565] [0.598]
R-squared 0.72 0.8 0.8 0.44 0.6 0.62
Observations 127 127 127 104 104 104
Civil Rights violations 1.134 ** 1.420 *** 1.410 ** 0.037 0.235 0.183
per 1000 SC/ST pop [0.366] [0.392] [0.449] [0.941] [0.695] [0.772]
R-squared 0.71 0.79 0.8 0.75 0.9 0.9
Observations 132 132 132 64 64 64
Demographic & economic controls Y Y Y Y
Control for woman CM Y Y Y Y
Control for police strength Y Y
All crime variables are in logs. All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets, corrected for clustering at state-level.
Regression for 11 major states and years 1992-2007.
Demographic & economic controls include literacy, urbanization, female-male ratio, % population in farming and
real per capita state domestic product.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Crimes against SC Crimes against ST
SC/ST Political Representation and Crimes Against SC/ST
Table V
Crimes 
against 
women Rape
Kidnapping of 
women
All crimes 
other than 
against 
women
Kidnapping 
of men
Crimes 
against 
women
All crimes 
other than 
against 
women
Crimes 
against 
women
All 
crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Women's Reservation Implemented 0.296* 0.116 0.175 *** 0.251 * -0.062 0.029 0.206 0.345 -0.216
[0.153] [0.076] [0.060] [0.120] [0.109] [0.066] [0.201] [0.979] [1.864]
R-squared 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.78 0.73 0.82 0.22 0.83 0.87
Observations 340 340 323 340 312 340 340 289 289
Demographic & economic controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control for woman CM Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Control for police strength Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Chargesheeting rates in percentages. Chargesheeting rate is the percentage of arrests which are upheld by a magistrate.
All regressions include state and year fixed effects.
Standard errors in brackets, corrected for clustering at state-level.
Regression for 17 major states and years 1988-2007; chargesheeting data is from 1991-2007.
Demographic & economic controls include literacy, urbanization, female-male ratio, % population in farming and
real per capita state domestic product.
Each cell represents the coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables with appropriate controls.
Post-reform dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections with reservations for women.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Log (Arrests per 1000 population) Arrests per crime Chargesheeting rate
Table VI
Women's Political Representation and Police Activity
Village council 
member or 
president
Local 
politician
Others/Don’t 
know
If victim 
goes alone
If victim goes 
with a local 
influential 
person
If victim 
goes alone
If victim goes 
with a local 
influential person
(1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction responding "Yes" 0.48 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.15 0.25 0.14 0.24
Individual level responses from the State of the Nation Survey, January 2009.  Survey data covers 14404 respondents from 17 major states.
"Others" in column (4) include state legislators, caste leaders, religious leaders and elders outside your family. Don't know responses coded as "no" for columns (5)-(8).
The difference between column (5) and (6) is statistically significant at the 1% level; similarly for the difference between columns (7) and (8).
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Village council head position reserved 0.024 0.017 0.120 * -0.039 -0.023 0.07 -0.356 * 0.006
for women in 2000 [0.023] [0.013] [0.069] [0.026] [0.087] [0.045] [0.211] [0.051]
Observations 1514 9282 132 900 132 900 49 433
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.29 0.13 0.54 0.11
Individual level responses from the Millenial Survey
Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the Gram Panchayat (village council) level.  All regressions control for state fixed effects, village class dummies, 
and individual characteristics (religion, caste, education and occupation).
Columns (3)-(8) only for those who report having some interaction with the police.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table VII
Panel B: Women's Political Representation and Women's Interactions with Police
Police acted efficiently and 
the case was solved
Police did not register the 
complaint Paid Bribe to Police
Approached the police in last 
5 years
How Do Local Leaders Affect Interactions with Law Enforcement Officials?
Panel A: Perceptions of Local Leader Impact
(3)
In a case of theft, do you 
think the police will listen 
sympathetically
If you ever have difficulty in getting an important work done, 
whom will you first think of approaching for help?
In a case of theft, do you think 
the police will take 
appropriate action
Government 
official
Log (murders 
per 1000 
population)
Log (murders of 
women per 
1000 women)
Log (murders of 
men per 1000 
men)
Log (murders due 
to sexual affairs 
per 1000 women)
Share of murders 
attributed to sexual 
affairs/dowry 
reasons
Log (suicides of 
women per 1000 
women)
Log (suicides 
of men per 
1000 men)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Women's Reservation Implemented -0.148 -0.068 0.195 0.089 0.01 0.055 0.069
[0.105] [0.175] [0.125] [0.089] [0.008] [0.070] [0.054]
Observations 391 32 32 315 320 390 390
R-squared 0.76 0.78 0.81 0.89 0.81 0.96 0.97
State & year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demographic & economic controls Y Y Y Y Y
Control for woman CM Y Y Y Y Y
Control for police strength Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Regressions in (2) and (3) contain data from 1999-2007, and are restricted to the four states which implemented
women's political reservations after 1999. All other columns include 17 major states and the period 1985-2007.
Standard errors in brackets, corrected for clustering at state-level.
 *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Each cell represents the coefficient on the post-reform dummy for the outcome variables with
appropriate controls. Post-reform dummy equals 1 for years after the first local government elections 
with reservations for women.
Demographic & economic controls include literacy, urbanization, female-male ratio, % population 
in farming and real per capita state domestic product.
Table VIII
Women's Political Representation and Crimes where Reporting Bias is Likely to be Least
(1) (2) (3)
District Chairperson reserved for women 0.046 0.019 -0.008
[0.030] [0.030] [0.032]
District Chairperson reserved for women *Female/Male ratio 2.206***
[0.541]
District Chairperson reserved for women *Female literacy 0.702***
[0.179]
Women's reservation implemented at state level 0.168** 0.188*** 0.197***
[0.073] [0.067] [0.068]
Observations 3943 3943 3943
R-squared 0.86 0.87 0.87
District and year FE Y Y Y
Demographic controls Y Y Y
OLS IV
(1) (2)
Log (Crimes against women per 1000 women) 2.809 5.049 *
[1.935] [2.859]
R-squared 0.89 0.89
Observations 391 391
Log (Rapes per 1000 women) 1.123 0.93
[1.215] [1.700]
R-squared 0.83 0.83
Observations 391 391
Log (Kidnapping of women & girls per 1000 women) 1.199 1.23
[0.994] [1.982]
R-squared 0.92 0.92
Observations 340 340
State & year FE Y Y
Demographic & economic controls Y Y
Control for woman CM & police strength Y Y
Regressions are for 17 major states and years 1985-2007. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at the state-level. *, ** 
and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Demographic controls include female literacy, 
urbanization and female-male ratio; economic controls include % population in farming and real per capita state 
domestic product.
Regressions are for 188 districts in 10 major states and years 1987-2007. Demographic controls include female 
literacy, urbanization and female-male ratio. Standard errors in brackets, clustered at district-level. *, ** and *** 
indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Female/Male ratio and Female literacy variables are demeaned in 
columns 2 and 3 respectively.
Table IX
The Effect of Women's Political Representation at Higher Levels of Office
Log (Crimes against women per 1000 women)
Proportion of women legislators
Panel B: The Impact of Women in State Legislatures
Panel A: The Impact of Women District Chairpersons
Figure I
Nationwide Trends in Selected Crime Categories
Figure II
Year-by-year Effects of Women's Empowerment
Notes: Each point on the graph represents the impact of women's representation on total crimes against women after a given 
number of years. The zero point on the X-axis represents the year of the reform; the dates of reform vary across states as 
documented in Table 2.
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